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The gasoline retail industry has evolved significantly since the early 1970's.  Retail outlets
now sell more gasoline while the total number of outlets has declined.  Whereas in the early
1970's the overwhelming majority of stations provided full-service and repair facilities, that is no
longer the case.  Beginning in the 1970's, many oil companies have also begun to operate some
of their retail outlets directly, while the number of dealers has declined.2
In response, several states have banned company-operated stations in the gasoline retail
industry.  This unusual restriction, known as divorcement, has been legislated in six states.3 
Similarly, several recent lawsuits and other legislation have sought to impose other restrictions
on company-operated stations or on refiner-dealer relationships.
                    
1. This paper grew out of a project performed by Lexecon for the American Petroleum
Institute.  The views in the paper are solely those of the authors and not necessarily
those of API.  We thank Thomas Hogarty forhelpful comments.
2. Company-operated stations are typically operated by salaried employees of the
integrated refiner.  The company sets retail price and other operating policies and retains
profits.  By contrast, dealers lease the station and equipment from the refiner, set retail
prices and retain the profits.
3. These states include Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada
and Virginia.- 2 -
Underlying many arguments for divorcement legislation and other restrictions is a belief
that refiners are attempting to eliminate their retail dealers through predatory practices so that
they can ultimately increase prices and profits to the detriment of consumers.  The arguments
deny the possibility that the company operations are simply an efficient response to changing
market conditions.  By contrast, the efficiency hypothesis suggests that the decision to operate a
station directly or though a dealer is motivated by cost considerations and that the trend towards
directly operated stations is a response to changes in the economics of gasoline marketing.
From the economic literature on franchising, we know that lessee dealers are more likely
to be used in those situations where on-site monitoring is important.  Lessee dealers are less
likely to be used where the lessor must invest heavily in the site.  The number of stations that
provide full automotive service and repairs has declined.  Moreover, stations today are much
bigger than they were and are more likely to be configured as self service or convenience stores.
 Such changes would mitigate the need for on-site monitoring and so reduce the desirability of a
lessee-dealer compared to a company operated station.
This study, which relies on a unique national database provided by ten large integrated
refiners, examines whether the investment behavior from 1984-88 of the refiners is consistent
with predatory pricing or whether it is more likely to be an efficient response to market conditions.
 More specifically, if integrated refiners were attempting to drive their lessee dealers from
business, they would not be investing in lessee dealer stations.  We find just the opposite --
refiners have been investing in these stations through new construction, improvements in
existing stations and by actually converting stations from being company-operated to dealer-run.
We then attempt to measure the effects of divorcement on investment.4  Specifically, if it
is efficient under some circumstances for refiners to operate stations, then a law that restricts
                    
4. As mentioned earlier, there have been a number of studies that have documented the
harmful effects of divorcement on gasoline prices and station hours in Maryland
(Sorensen, 1988; Barron and Umbeck, 1984).  More generally, the U.S. Dept. of Energy
(1984) concludes (p. iv) the "Divorcement laws ... result in inefficient distribution and
higher gasoline prices."- 3 -
refiner-operated stations should result in refiners investing less in states passing such laws.  We
find that in those states the rate of investment in new stations has indeed been lower.
Next, we investigate whether the decision on whether a newly constructed station will be
company-operated or dealer-operated seems to be driven by efficiency considerations.  If market
efficiency determined the form of retail operation, we would expect that company-operated
stations might have different characteristics from dealer-operated stations.  Specifically, we
would expect to find relatively more company-operated stations in those instances where
monitoring is less important.  We indeed find that company-operated stations are relatively more
prevalent if a station has no service facilities and more gasoline volume sold through self
service.  This confirms the findings of Shepard (1993) on a different, more narrow database. 
Finally, we show how to use a probit analysis to estimate the cost of divorcement legislation, first
under the assumption that station characteristics are exogenous, and then under the
assumption that characteristics and mode are simultaneously determined.
We conclude that the evidence is inconsistent with an alleged attempt to drive dealers
out of business.  Instead, the presence and growth of company operations appears to be an
efficient response to market conditions.  It is therefore highly likely that further divorcement
legislature would be harmful, and that repeal of existing divorcement legislation would be
beneficial.
Before describing the data and the results, we briefly review the competing hypotheses: 
predation vs. efficiency.- 4 -
Predation
Both the proponents of divorcement and those seeking other restraints have argued that
restrictions are particularly needed because of the numerous ways that integrated refiners can
and supposedly have driven their dealers out of business.  One dominant theme is that the major
oil companies discriminate against their own retail dealers by charging them too much for
gasoline either relative to the prices charged to independent wholesalers5 or relative to the retail
prices set by company-operated stations.6  Another claim is that the refiners expropriate
excessive rents from their dealers in the form of unreasonably high lease fees.7  In addition, it
has been claimed that the oil companies have imposed other burdensome operating conditions.
 As proof of the alleged predatory practices, the critics have pointed to the decline in the number
of retail dealers and reduced profitability.  They conclude that only by imposing restrictions on the
majors can these predatory practices be curtailed, thereby enhancing consumer welfare in the
long run.
These claims have been seriously discredited because divorcement has clearly not
benefitted consumers.  Maryland, the first state to legislate divorcement in 1974, has actually
admitted that divorcement has been harmful to consumers because gasoline retail prices were
not lower than they would have otherwise been (Department of Fiscal Services, 1988, p. 1).8 
Similarly, alleged "proof" of predatory pricing in non-divorcement states, such as the decline in
                    
5. As a response to that alleged practice, proposed legislation introduced into the United
States Senate in 1987 would have permitted dealers to make open market purchases of
up to 30 percent of sales, even though the current agreements between the companies
and dealers might require all gasoline to be purchased directly from the company. 
Michigan has recently considered legislation in which a dealer could purchase supplies
from wholesalers rather than from the company that leases the station to the dealer.
6. Shepard's (1993) results suggest lower retail prices by company operated stations.
7. It should be noted that the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (1978) already places
restrictions on the way refiners can terminate or refuse to renew leases.
8. In addition, station hours have been reduced thereby further curtailing consumer welfare
(Barron and Umbeck, 1984).- 5 -
the number of dealerships can easily be explained by nationwide trends that show a marked
decline in the demand for car repair services at gasoline stations and a simultaneous increase in
specialty shop repairs (Temple, Barker & Sloane, 1988).9  The evidence also indicates that
contrary to allegations, company-operated stations rarely sell at retail prices below the wholesale
prices charged to dealers.
Perhaps most importantly, the predation hypothesis is internally inconsistent because
there is no evidence to suggest that an integrated refiner could ever benefit if it were successful
in driving out its dealers.  The reason is that there is no compelling evidence of retail market
power:  entry is easy, competitors are numerous and brand value is not believed to be
significant.
There are, nonetheless, testable implications of the predation hypothesis.  In particular,
the predation hypothesis implies that refiners will not set up any new lessee dealers and would
certainly not make additional investments in existing lessee dealers.  In addition, the predation
hypothesis, by denying that monitoring costs differ across stations would predict that a station's
configuration is unrelated to its operation mode.  Indeed the predation hypothesis predicts no
pattern of dealer operations at stations with repair facilities.  Our dataset allows us to test these
predictions directly.
Efficiency Hypothesis
The efficiency hypothesis suggests that the decision to operate a station directly or
through a dealer is motivated by cost considerations.  Independent dealers are businessmen
who as residual claimants hire employees, set prices and retain profits.  As such, they provide
benefits when local supervision is required, compared to a company operated station where the
manager is not the residual claimant.  Dealer operations are efficient, compared to company
                    
9. The decline of dealerships in gasoline retailing is by no means unique.  In some
industries such as the automobile repair business, dealerships have declined as early as
the 1960's even though in others, franchises have flourished.- 6 -
operations, when they can improve a company's responsiveness to local market conditions and
can limit inventory and labor costs.  This could be true if automotive repairs and services are
provided at the station.
It would also be true that lessee dealers are an efficient business form in a competitive
environment when rapid price adjustments are required.  Dealers are less efficient when labor
costs are low, when customer service is unimportant, or when the refiner must make large site
specific investments.  Such conditions are met in high volume self service stations.  In those
situations, little if any entrepreneurial skills are needed, and there is a risk that a valuable
expensive facility will be poorly run with no ability (because of numerous legal prohibitions on
terminations) to change management.
The efficiency hypothesis would predict that dealerships will continue to be established,
but that the decision on operation mode will be a function of cost.  Indeed we should expect to
see relatively more lessee dealers with service bays and at low volume stations.
Description of Data
We collected data from ten integrated refiners who comprised (as of 1986) approximately
half of U.S. retail gasoline sales as well as half of U.S. refining capacity.10  Indeed this is, to our
knowledge, the first national study which examines the question at hand.  For each newly
constructed station in the year 1984-1987, the following variables were assembled:  year of initial
operation, 1988 mode of operation (dealer or company-operated), 1988 volume as well as
number of service bays in 1988.  In addition, we obtained data on investments in existing lessee
dealers, conversions of company-operated stations, and volume data for open (i.e., dealer-
owned stations) vs. lessee dealers (to test the rent predation theory) by state and year.
Results
                    
10. Our analysis is based on data from ten of the major integrated refiners in the United
States.- 7 -
A. Refiner's Investments in Lessee Dealers
The predation hypothesis implies that refiners should not be setting-up any new lessee
dealers.  As we described earlier, the efficiency hypothesis predicts that refiners will continue to
establish new lessee dealers because they are an efficient mode of distribution in certain
economic circumstances.  The data support the efficiency hypothesis and are inconsistent with
the predation hypothesis.
Between 1984 and 1987, integrated refiners constructed 112 new lessee dealer stations
in non-divorcement states, which amounts to 22 percent of the total of newly constructed
stations (based on information from the nine out of ten companies that provided relevant data). 
See Table 1.  Many newly constructed stations are run directly by the company for a brief start-
up period until they are attractive enough to lease to a dealer.  That is why in 1988 a smaller
percentage of stations constructed in 1986 and 1987 (16 percent) were run by dealers,
compared to the corresponding percentage of stations constructed in 1984 and 1985 (32
percent).  The number of newly constructed stations, as described in Table 1, actually
understates the number of new lessee dealer stations because it does not include stations
acquired from other companies, many of which were retained as lessee dealers, nor does it
include new dealerships which were previously operated as company-operated stations.- 8 -
Table 1
Newly Constructed Stations in Non-Divorcement States
1984-1987
Mode of Operation in 1988 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total
Company Operated 45 95 96 165 401
Lessee Dealers 22 42 21 27 112
Percent Lessee Dealers 32.8 30.7 18.6 14.1 22.0
Total 67 137 117 192 513
Source: Data provided by nine refiners.
Perhaps more interesting is the fact that between 1986 and 1988 nine integrated refiners
chose to convert a total of 646 company-operated stations to lessee dealers, as seen in Table 2.
 By contrast, under the predation hypothesis, refiners would never convert company-operated
stations to lessee dealers.  Here too, the predation hypothesis is refuted and the efficiency
hypothesis confirmed.- 9 -
Table 2
Conversions of Company-Operated Stations to Lessee Dealer Stations
1986-1988
Year
Number of Company-Operated Stations





Source: Data provided by nine refiners.
The predation hypothesis predicts no new investment in existing lessee dealer stations
while the efficiency hypothesis does.  As seen in Table 3, integrated refiners invested well over
$1 billion in new and existing lessee dealer stations (based on information from the nine
companies that provided relevant data).
Table 3









Source: Data provided by nine refiners.- 10 -
This investment behavior is not the sort that one would expect if the refiners were engaging in
predatory conduct.
B. Divorcement and Investment
An additional harmful effect of divorcement is that it could reduce the incentive for
companies to invest in states that forbid the efficient ownership mode.  If it is more efficient for
growth to occur in company-operated stations, then rates of investment growth in newly
constructed stations should be lower in states that forbid company-operated stations.
As Table 4 indicates, the hypothesis is confirmed.  From 1984 to 1987, new investments
increased by 153 percent in non-divorcement states (for all ten companies in our survey) but
decreased by 8 percent in divorcement states.
Table 4
Investment in Newly Constructed Stations - 1984-1987
(Thousands of Dollars)




AK 0 0 0 1,480 .
AL 0 1,110 639 822 .
AR 465 0 0 0 -100
AZ 3,406 1,010 11,003 21,360 527
CA 9,958 18,184 16,833 35,923 261
CO 0 361 1,200 2,938 .
* CT 0 893 3,324 1,360 .
* DC 2,200 0 1,314 400 -82
* DE 0 0 0 0 .
FL 14,979 13,751 21,718 41,841 179- 11 -
Table 4
Investment in Newly Constructed Stations - 1984-1987
(Thousands of Dollars)




GA 1,962 5,344 4,130 7,761 296
HI 0 606 0 800 .
IA 100 200 400 0 -100
ID 0 0 0 0 .
IL 3,815 20,710 7,590 5,527 45
IN 1,497 1,469 0 1,900 27
KS 2,200 500 0 1,500 -32
KY 0 0 0 0 .
LA 4,279 5,991 1,770  1,333 -69
MA 0 1,032 0 2,312 .
* MD 11,839 2,805 2,894 7,664 -35
ME 0 0 0 0 .
MI 100 600 1,959 2,960 2,860
MN 400 900 1,800 2,400 500
MO 3,110 4,020 2,050 2,597 -16
MS 0 703 476 909 .
MT 0 0 0 0 .
NC 727 544 639 3,853 430
ND 0 0 0 0 .
NE 2,000 0 0 0 -100
NH 0 0 0 1,915 .
NJ 9,364 3,834 1,410 7,924 -15
NM 0 0 0 0 .
* NV 4,426 1,066 2,484 3,400 -23
NY 2,919 300 500 4,420 51
OH 1,764 3,711 3,195 6,268 255
OK 0 0 0 0 .- 12 -
Table 4
Investment in Newly Constructed Stations - 1984-1987
(Thousands of Dollars)




OR 0 0 2,644 2,089 .
PA 4,200 3,197 4,181 1,045 -75
RI 0 0 0 1,033 .
SC 358 2,609 1,039 6,771 1,791
SD 0 0 0 0 .
TN 1,127 7,603 2,645 2,026 80
TX 19,715 26,124 33,549 51,816 163
UT 554 0 543 0 -100
* VA 3,293 2,791 3,435 7,130 117
VT 0 0 0 0 .
WA 2,727 5,049 3,350 13,356 390
WI 0 0 800 1,000 .
WV 1,662 0 2,768 0 -100
WY 800 0 0 0 -100




94,188 129,462 128,831 237,878 153
Divorcement 21,758 7,555 13,451 19,954 -8
Source: Data provided by ten refiners.
* Denotes states with divorcement legislation.
Note:  Nevada became a divorcement state in July 1987.
Table 5 column (1) presents an OLS regression that shows that total investment by state
in newly constructed stations is dependent on the level of company-operated retail sales but not- 13 -
on the level of dealer sales.  For every gallon sold, almost 4 cents of investment will be made. 
Therefore, restricting company-operated sales lowers investment.  Clearly any policy of
divorcement is harmful to investment.
Table 5
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Source: Data on sales in gallons provided by seven refiners.
Standard errors are in parentheses.- 14 -
C. Determinants of Station Mode
If predation is not the explanation for the presence of company-operated stations, it is
highly likely that the mode of station organizational structure is an efficient response to market
conditions.  If the organization is indeed efficiency based, we would expect to see more
company-operated stations where the capital-labor ratio is high and where monitoring costs are
low, specifically in those stations with high volume gasoline sales but without car repair facilities.
 By contrast, the predation hypothesis implies that company-operated stations would be just as
likely to occur at high volume as at low volume stations and that there would be no pattern of
dealer operations at stations with repair facilities.
As seen in Tables 6 and 7, the evidence supports the efficiency hypothesis.  Table 6
shows that newly constructed stations in non-divorcement states are more likely to be run by
lessee dealers when volume is less than 1,250,000 gallons per year than when volume is above
1,250,000 gallons per year.  When volume is less than 1,250,000 gallons per year, 27.8 percent
of all newly constructed stations are run by dealers, compared to about 20.3 percent when
volume is greater than 1,250,000 gallons.
As indicated earlier, many newly constructed stations are run directly by the company for
a start-up period until they are leased to a dealer.  For that reason, volume differences among
dealer and company-operated stations constructed during 1984-85 may be more probative than
an analysis of the entire 1984-87 period.  For stations constructed in 1984-85, almost half of all
low volume stations are run by dealers whereas 27 percent of the other stations are run by
dealers.  A chi-squared text (x2 = 8.11) rejects the hypothesis of no difference in volume by
mode of operation at the 2 percent level.
Table 7 describes the difference between company-operated and dealer stations in the
number of bays.  Only 18 percent of newly constructed stations without service bays are
operated by dealers while more than half of newly constructed stations with bays are run by- 15 -
dealers.  The hypothesis that dealers and company-operated stations are no different and that














< 2.25 Vol > 2.25 Total
Construction  in 1984-1987
Company
Operated
78 119 109 95 401
Lessee Dealer 30 31 29 22 112
% Lessee Dealer 27.8 20.7 21.0 18.8 21.8
Total 108 150 138 117 513
Construction  in 1984-1985
Company
Operated
22 45 38 35 140
Lessee Dealer 21 16 16 11 64
% Lessee Dealer 48.8 26.2 29.6 23.9 31.4
Total 43 61 54 46 204
Source: Data provided by nine refiners.
C
2
(2) = 8.11 (significant at 2% confidence level)- 16 -
Table 7








374 1 12 12 2 401
Lessee Dealer 83 0 13 15 1 112
% Lessee Dealer 18.2 0.0 52.0 55.6 33.3 21.8
Total 457 1 25 27 3 513




We can further describe the likelihood of a newly constructed station to be run by a
dealer or by the company using a probit analysis. According to the efficiency hypothesis, a
company chooses its mode of operations based on its profits.  Profit is a function of volume and
the number of bays as well as other unobserved variables.
According to the efficiency hypothesis, conditional on observing the volume and
number of bays, the mode of operation can be predicted.  According to the predation hypothesis,
there is no necessary relationship between the mode of operation and the volume and number of
bays.  As seen in Table 8, the probit coefficients on volume and bays have the correct signs and
are generally significant.  Columns 5-7 focus on stations built during 1984 and 1985.  As already
described, data from these stations are the most reliable to use since mode choice in 1988 is
likely to be the intended mode of operation.  The results show that both volume and bays are
statistically significant determinants of mode choice.  Specifically, low volume and number of
repair bays positively influence the likelihood of a lessee dealer mode of operation.  In the- 17 -
remaining columns, we present results for the entire period.  This data set has the drawback that
the mode choice variable is not as reliably measured for stations built in 1986 and 1987 as for
stations built in 1984 and 1985.  Still, results generally confirm the findings in Columns 5-7. 
(However, to obtain statistical significant for the volume coefficient, it is necessary to add a
dummy variable for one company with a proclivity to open stations that, at least initially, are
lessee dealers.)- 18 -
Table 8
Probit Maximum Likelihood Results














































































 Operated 78.56 78.56 78.56 78.56 71.08 71.08 71.08
Log Likelihood -255 -246 -255 -247 -121 -121 -120
Source: Data provided by nine refiners.
Dependent Variable - Lessee Dealer in 1988 - 1; Company Operated in 1988 - 0
Standard errors are in parentheses.- 19 -
The Cost of Divorcement
We can use the probit analysis to obtain a rough measure of the cost of requiring
divorcement -- that is, of requiring all company operated stations to become lessee-dealer
stations.  We use two approaches with the second being more sophisticated and complicated
than the first.
A. Station Characteristics Are Exogenous
Assume first that the volume (x1) and number of repair bays (x2) of a station are
exogenous and independent of mode of operation.  The choice of mode of operation will depend
on whether the average cost of operation at lessee dealers (cd) exceeds the average cost of
operation at company operated stations (co).
Let  e   +   x   +   x   +     =   c d 2 d 1 d d d b a g , and
e   +   x   +   x   +     =   c o 2 o 1 o o o b a g , where
ei 1 are iid random normal variables.
It follows that the probability of a lessee dealer configuration is:
where F(.) indicates the value of the cumulative distribution that describes the distribution of
differences in ei.  If we take the distribution of costs to be normal with standard deviation s, then
e   -   e   =   e
and     -     =   b
and     -     =   b
    -     =   a
 where , ) x b   +   x b   +   (a   F   =   P
or   , ) x b   +   x b   +   a   <   e (+   Prob   =   P
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o)   <   e   +   x b   -   x b   -   (-a   Prob   = ]  c   <   c [   Prob   =   P 2 2 1 1 o d
)
  2
x b   +   x b   +   a
(   N   =   P
2 2 1 1
s- 20 -
where N(.) indicates the value of the cumulative normal.11
The probit maximum likelihood results in Table 8 provide estimates of 
s   2
a , 
s   2
b 1 ,
and 
s   2
b2
.   In order to estimate the difference in costs between configurations, it is
necessary to know the size of s, which represents the standard deviation of costs, conditional
on mode of operation, volume and bays.  We use an estimate of the standard deviation of price
to figure out how to estimate this standard deviation.  Shepard (1993) showed that the standard
deviations of lessee dealer prices in Eastern Massachusetts in 1987 ranged from 4.75 cents to
10.5 cents per gallon for regular unleaded gas according to type of service.12  Controlling for
capacity (presumably strongly correlated with volume), bays and other variables reduces the
standard deviations by about 20 percent.13  Further removing the area specific component of
price dispersion reduces the conditional standard deviation of price for regular unleaded gas at
lesser dealers in the Shepard (1993) sample to a range of 4 to 5 cents.14
That range, however, probably understates s.  One reason is that the price variation
reflects a truncated distribution of ed as we only observe lessee dealers for whom ed is not very
high.  Second, the area specific effect may not be the same across modes of operation, in which
case the variation over time in price will underestimate the s required to calculate the variation of
ed - eo.  However, in private correspondence, we have learned that an idiosyncratic time
component may further reduce the range by up to 50 percent so that the range across all
stations of s could be as small as 2 to 3 cents (1987 price levels).  Again, this reduction in range
                    
11. If ed and eo are iid, each with variance s, then ed - eo has variance 2 s
2.
12.  The standard deviations for her much smaller sample of company operated stations (38
stations vs. 452 lessee dealers) ranged from 3.56 cents to 12.80 cents.  See Shephard,
1993, Table 1.
13.  Shepard, 1993, Table 2, and Table 1.
14.  The comparable range for company-operated stations is 3 to 6 cents.- 21 -
likely understates the true s  because the idiosyncratic component likely varies across station
types.  This range (which likely underestimates s ) translates into a range of about 3 to 4 cents in
1998 dollars because the consumer price index rose by approximately 42 percent from 1987
until the first quarter of 1998.  Accordingly, we assume conservatively that s equals 3 cents. 
However, our results can readily be scaled to higher, and probably more realistic estimates of s.
The average difference in average cost (i.e., E [cd - co]) between a station now
company operated and one that is switched over to become a lessee dealer is therefore
which exceeds









* * 03 s , where
a*, b*1, b*2 are the (negative of) the estimated probit coefficients from Table 8.
The total cost difference for a 2 million gallon station (a typical volume for company operated
stations) with no bays is between $50,000 to $90,000 depending upon the specification.15 
Based on these estimates, the costs of divorcement legislation, (based on about 15,000
company operated stations) could easily exceed $1 billion annually.16
The foregoing analysis assumed that station characteristics are exogenous and
independent of the mode of operation.  Indeed, other work such as Shepard (1993) also
                    
15. For example, using column 5 of Table 8, the total cost difference is
    10     2   2)     .3   +   (.06   ) (.0   2
6 • • 3  or about $55,000.
16. Stations could also cease operation.  We ignore the operating cost savings from closure
and ignore the harm to consumers from closure.
)], dealer   lessee not    s station wa /   e   -   e (   E   +   ) x c   +   x b   +   a (   [E     2 o d 2
*
1
* * s- 22 -
assumed that characteristics were exogenous and that firms choose the type of station to build
based on traffic flow and the level of competition and only later decide the optimal organizational
form for the station.  For older stations, it might be appropriate to assume that configuration is
exogenous since the layouts of such stations were presumably chosen long ago and once built it
is hard to enlarge a station.  For new stations, however, we expect that the mode of operation
will; be chosen simultaneously with volume and the number of bays.  Indeed, we understand
from industry participants that it would be incorrect to assume otherwise.  So for those stations it
would be inaccurate to use the coefficients of a probit regression that predicts mode choice as a
function of volume in order to estimate costs, since the probit model explicitly assumes that
volume is exogenous.  Instead, it would be appropriate to devise a different model in which
configuration and mode of operation were determined simultaneously in order to estimate the
cost of divorcement legislation.
B. Characteristics and Mode Simultaneously Determined
We now construct a model in which configuration and mode of operation are
determined simultaneously.  In our model, company-operated and lessee-dealer stations profit
functions are quadratic with respect to volume.  The cost incurred from converting company
operated stations to lessee dealer stations is the difference between expected profits under
company operation and dealer management.  In order to identify all the parameters, we must
impose some assumptions about zero-profit volumes for company-operated and lessee dealer
stations respectively.  A station will be chosen to be company operated if Po > Pd where Pi
indicates profit to the oil company and i indicates the mode of operation (o = company operated,
d = dealer operated).  Assume that P is a quadratic function of volume so that- 23 -
, e + c + V b + V a = i i i
2
i i P
where V  =  station volume,
ai, bi, ci = unknown parameters, and
ei = error.
For any mode i, we know that the station will choose to operate at volume 
a 2
b -
  =   V
i
i *
i ,  
at which point,  e   +   )
a 4




i i P .  Company operation instead of dealer operation is chosen if
 Po > Pd, or if
e   -   e   >   )
a 4
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Once all parameters are estimated, we can calculate the extra cost from converting an
already built station from one ownership mode to another but, unlike the previous calculation, we
have explicitly accounted for the simultaneous choice of volume and mode of operation in
estimating the parameters.  Since the station is already built, its volume can, as a rough
approximation, be taken as exogenous for purposes of estimating extra costs (though not for




o o P P  as the extra cost incurred to
switch each company owned station to a dealer owned.  (Notice that  Po  is evaluated
atV
*
o not  V
*
d ).
In order to identify all parameters, we must either have some exogenous variable or
impose some assumptions.  Because we have no exogenous variable, we are forced to impose
some simplifying assumptions to illustrate our approach.  Our calculations should be regarded
as preliminary.  Let a0 = ad = a.  Then, using the average volume at stations of each type, we
know that- 24 -
2a
b -
  =   V
o
o      and      2a
b -
  =   V
d
d , (2)
where V i = average annual volume at stations in operation mode i.
In our sample,  V o   approximately equals 2 million gallons and Vd  approximately equals 1.25
million gallons.
In our sample, we find very few owner operated stations at an annual volume of 1 million
gallons or below and very few lessee dealer stations at an annual volume of .5 million gallons or
below.  Accordingly, we impose the conditions that
PO (1) = 0 and Pd (.5) = 0, (3)
Using (1) to estimate the probit, we can estimate (up to a scalar) the constant
4a
b   +  
4a





d o  as .4717.  We identify the scalar, as before, by using an estimate of price
dispersion to estimate in this case the conditional dispersion of profits per unit.  Using the same
assumption as before ( s = $0.03),  it follows that on average the standard deviation of the error
term in the profit equation equals .03 times average station volume (approximately 1.5 million
gallons).18  (This implies that the standard deviation of the probit error is at least
10     1.5     0.0     2 • • • 3 .)
                    
17. I.e., F(.47) = .69 where F is the cumulative normal and .69 is the fraction of stations that
are lessee dealers in 1988 of stations built in l984-85.
18.  If the standard deviation of profit per gallon is .03, then the standard deviation of profit for
a typical station is .03 times typical volume.- 25 -
Using the probit together with equations (2) and (3), we are able to estimate all the
parameters.  Therefore, we can calculate the extra cost resulting from converting company
operated stations to lesser dealer stations as  ) V (   - ) V ( o o o d P P .  That cost is estimated to
be about $70,000 per station.  This leads to an overall annual cost estimate (based on 15,000
company operated stations) of about one billion dollars.19
Using a series of alternative reasonable assumptions, we obtain cost estimates ranging
from 0.6 to 2.1 billion dollars.  In the table below, we present alternative cost estimates of
divorcement based on varying assumptions regarding zero profits. 20
Table 9
Cost Estimates Of Divorcement Under Different Assumptions
Company zero profit volume
(million gallons)
1.0 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2
Dealer zero profit volume
(million gallons)
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6
Cost of divorcement
($ billion)
1.02 1.81 0.62 1.61 1.16 2.06
We regard both our approaches to measuring the cost of divorcement as crude but
illustrative of the large cost likely to accompany a policy of divorcement.  Moreover, we calculate
the cost of divorcement only for major refiners.  The cost for non-major refiners is likely higher
because non-majors typically rely more heavily on company operations than majors in marketing
their brand of gasoline.  Divorcement therefore creates a barrier to entry for the non-majors.
                    
19. Since our estimates were based on the conditions imposed by equation (3), we
performed a sensitivity analysis to determine how changes in the assumptions about the
quantities at which profits are zero might affect our estimates.  See Table below.  Our
cost estimates range from .06 to 2.0 billion dollars.
20. A necessary condition for our method to work is that the difference between the average
and minimum station volume for company operated stations is larger than the difference
for dealer operated stations.  This condition is satisfied in our data set.- 26 -
Lastly, we note that, in a recent FTC study using cross-sectional data (across states),
Vita (1999) estimated the overall annual consumer cost (based on 1999 volumes) following
divorcement to be even higher than our estimates (based on early 1990 volumes) -- $2.5 billion.
Conclusions
We find no evidence to indicate that predation is a motivating factor in the choice
between company operation and dealer operation of gasoline service stations.  Indeed, every
test provides robust support for the hypothesis that the refiners are motivated by efficiency
considerations.  A policy of divorcement adversely affects investments in gasoline stations and
ultimately consumers.  We present two empirical analyses to estimate the likely cost of
divorcement.  In one estimate we ignore the simultaneous choice of mode of operation and
station characteristics, while in the other we explicitly account for this simultaneity.  Though each
calculation is crude, each indicates that a policy of divorcement is likely to impose significant
costs on society.i
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